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ABSTRACT
Cloud computing represents a significant paradigm shift in the delivery of information technology (IT) services.
The rapid growth of the cloud and the increasing security concerns associated with the delivery of cloud services
has led many researchers to study cloud risks and risk assessments. Some of these studies highlight the inability of
current risk assessments to cope with the dynamic nature of the cloud, a gap we believe is as a result of the lack of
consideration for the inherent risk of the supply chain. This paper, therefore, describes the cloud supply chain and
investigates the effect of supply chain transparency in conducting a comprehensive risk assessment. We conducted
an industry survey to gauge stakeholder awareness of supply chain risks, seeking to find out the risk assessment
methods commonly used, factors that hindered a comprehensive evaluation and how the current state-of-the-art can
be improved. The analysis of the survey dataset showed the lack of flexibility of the popular qualitative assessment
methods in coping with the risks associated with the dynamic supply chain of cloud services, typically made up of
an average of eight suppliers. To address these gaps, we propose a Cloud Supply Chain Cyber Risk Assessment
(CSCCRA) model, a quantitative risk assessment model which is supported by decision support analysis and supply
chain mapping in the identification, analysis and evaluation of cloud risks.
TYPE OF PAPER AND KEYWORDS
Regular research paper: cloud computing, cloud risks, supply chain, risk assessment, quantitative, transparency,
visualisation, visibility
1 INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing is an Information Technology (IT)
revolution, whose emergence not only disrupted
IT service delivery but also altered infrastructure
architecture and application development. Its ability
to transform people and processes with every adoption
has gradually made it a core component of digital
transformation strategies of organisations. Often referred
to as a computing resources management model [49],
cloud computing enables ubiquitous, convenient, on-
demand network access to a shared pool of configurable
computing resources, and can be rapidly provisioned and
released, with minimal management effort or service
provider interaction [56]. While cloud computing
technologies can be implemented based on a wide
variety of architectures, under different service and
deployment models, the security challenges that cloud
computing presents are formidable, particularly in the
public cloud, where infrastructure and computational
resources are owned and operated by third parties who
deliver the services via a multi-tenant platform [45].
The use of public cloud means that organisation’s
data and applications are managed outside their trust
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boundary, with the service provisioning potentially
requiring a dynamic supply chain. The supply chain
is the core of every cloud service delivery, and it
consists of a globally-distributed and dynamic collection
of people, processes and technologies that encompass
various software and hardware components [21]. The
security of a cloud service strongly depends on the cloud
provider (CP) and its supply chain, their implemented
processes and the infrastructure in place. While not
all cloud security problems are new, cloud computing
introduces a new set of risks, changing the probability of
success for a threat source and increasing the impact of
an attack [35]. Evidence also suggests that many of the
cloud risks are systems risks, where the greater the threat
of a failure along the supply chain, the more likely it is
for the cloud service to fail [22]. However, the variety
of parties involved in cloud service delivery makes it
difficult for cloud stakeholders to assess their cloud risks.
This new attack surface presents system administrators,
cloud customers (CC), co-tenants, and external attackers
with the opportunity to launch malicious or unintentional
attacks [12]. As such, cloud risks require new risk
assessment solutions.
Nevertheless, we acknowledge that assessing and
managing cloud risks can be a challenge since significant
portions of the computing services are under the control
of external parties. Cloud consumers find it difficult
to determine the location of their data and third parties
involved in its processing, due to the complex ecosystem
of suppliers involved in cloud delivery. Several lines of
evidence have suggested that this limited cloud supply
chain visibility is the reason why some cloud customers
engage in simple risk assessment based on qualitative
methods to ensure compliance, while others choose to
blindly trust their cloud providers without verifying the
existence of security controls [24, 72, 8]. Improving
cloud risk assessments, therefore, calls for a more
transparent supply chain and the visibility of security
controls.
Therefore, seeing that few studies have investigated
the effect of supply chain risks in cloud computing,
or looked into assessing cloud risks from a supply
chain perspective, we surveyed cloud professionals to
understand the industry practices with regards to cloud
risk assessment and their level of awareness of cyber
supply chain risks. Administering the survey to a
wide range of cloud professionals, many of whom are
experienced security and risk experts, we sought to
find out the conventional risk identification/assessment
methodologies employed within their environment,
and identify factors that could improve cloud risk
assessment. We present our findings in the result section
of this paper.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows:
In Section 2 we present the relevant background and
literature on cloud computing, supply chain and risk
management. Section 3 presents the cloud supply chain,
introducing the five elements of every cloud supply chain
and our proposed risk assessment model, Cloud Supply
Chain Cyber Risk Assessment (CSCCRA). Section 4
presents our survey results on cloud risk assessment and
supply chain risks, and Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Cloud computing, in its simplest sense, could be
referred to as a computing resources management
model. It is a method for pooling and distributing
hardware infrastructure resources on a massive scale
[49]. Cloud computing fosters innovation and is
described by Kushida et al. as simultaneously being
an innovation ecosystem, a production platform and a
global marketplace [49]. However, while some of this
innovation is novel, others have fundamentally been
transformed from an existing service and relabelled as
a cloud service. The efforts of the non-traditional
outsourcing companies like Amazon and Google are
seen to have led the introduction of the new cloud
business models, offering scalability, efficiency and
flexibility on a pay-per-use basis [50].
Risk, which is a function of the likelihood of the
occurrence of threat events and the potential adverse
impact of the events [66], has remained an important
topic in many discourses on cloud computing. In [5], a
security risk assessment is described as a process aimed
at examining possible threats and vulnerabilities as well
as the likelihood and impact of them per the external
and internal relative technology standards. The two
broad categories of risk assessment are the Qualitative
and Quantitative risk assessment methods [66]. Despite
the incentives for cloud stakeholders to take a proactive
and continuous approach to address information security
risks, not least for legal and compliance requirements,
there has been no reliable evidence that cloud providers
devote their attention to assessing and mitigating security
risks. Shameli-Sendi and Cheriet [69] also note that the
existing risk assessment frameworks have been unable to
cope with the challenges introduced by cloud computing.
This is perhaps due to the dynamic nature of the cloud
infrastructure and services, the lack of physical control,
the absence of a well-structured risk cloud management
framework and the lack of trust in cloud providers [55].
Cloud risks are associated with the processes,
procedures, and practices used to assure the
confidentiality, integrity, security, resilience, and
quality of cloud services [15]. These risks increase
with the on-demand, automated, and multi-tenanted
2
O. Akinrolabu, S. New, A. Martin: Cyber Supply Chain Risks in Cloud Computing – Bridging the Risk Assessment Gap
cloud, where customers and providers are rapidly
changing, technology advancing, and data and services
regularly exposed to new threats. Cloud supply chains
increasingly depend upon integrated and interoperable
IT systems for efficient management, and there
exists multi-level networked relationships among a
heterogeneous group of organisations, many of which
are small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) [38].
The vulnerability of these SMEs to cyber attacks is
magnified into the supply chains, where they represent
the weakest links, making them a ‘soft’ target for
cybersecurity breaches [51]. Recent studies, particularly
the Verizon Enterprise report [19], also showed that
92% of the cybersecurity incidents occurred among
small firms with inadequate security systems controls.
To further complicate the matter, organisations lack
clarity, understanding, and awareness of their suppliers’
dependencies or reliance on second, third or fourth
parties for cloud service delivery [21].
While the cloud faces some of the threats applicable
to any information system, it increasingly faces unique
threats and vulnerabilities. Cloud services are exposed
daily to new attack scenarios, which can be heightened
by vulnerabilities of the cloud provider (employees,
facilities, systems), the cloud technology (interfaces,
API) or even other cloud co-tenants [55]. Many pieces
of research have looked into the assessment of cloud
risks both quantitatively and qualitatively, and have listed
the typical challenges of risk assessment to include: (a)
lack of appropriate historical data, (b) lack of trust in
the cloud service providers (CSP) and the data provided
for risk assessment, (c) the dynamic supply chain of
infrastructure and services, (d) immature offering from
CSPs, and (e) the lack of visibility of security control
[55][30][27][5].
According to Jenks [46], there is a gap between
the processes needed to manage cyber risks in cloud
computing, and the implemented solutions. Our
reflection on literature identified a significant number
of reports addressing the existence of supply chain
security risks in cloud computing, but only a few
recommended solutions to these risks [58][54]. There
is limited information on how cloud threats apply to
real-world scenarios or the attack vector used, and the
result of those events [23]. Boyson [17] discussed a
recent study by Symantec, where, based on Symantec’s
network monitoring across 157 countries, they found
supply chain to be their latest threat vector, and attributed
this to the increased attacks on their contractors and
subcontractors who are often in possession of a valuable
intellectual property. The importance of continuous
risk evaluation is more evident in cloud computing than
traditional IT, primarily due to the dynamism of the
cloud supply chain. This has led leading organisations
and standards such as the Centre for the Protection of
National Infrastructure (CPNI) [36] and ISO21000 to
include the visibility, transparency and inclusivity of
third-party risks as crucial elements of effective risk
management.
The primary challenge of assessing cloud risks is that
the data needed to estimate the impact and likelihood
of risk scenarios or events are either unavailable or
inadequate [29]. Power [62] suggests that reputational
risk hinders this level of transparency, and the existing
industry approaches to promote transparency through
security certification, cloud provider self-assessment and
third party audits, have been flawed by their occurrence
on a yearly basis and due to customer’s lack of trust
[44]. The cloud industry’s lack of transparency is
characterised in the Cloud Security Alliance’s (CSA)
report on cloud outages between 2008 and 2013, where
they listed 172 unique cloud computing outage incidents
for the period, and at least 43 incidents (25%) had no
information on the root-cause of the outage [48]. Cloud
customers are often in the dark during cloud service
adoption, unable to distinguish between cloud services
based on security features or processes implemented by
the cloud providers. Nevertheless, Werff et al. [75] in
their compelling analysis of cloud trust, highlighted the
advantage of customer’s trust built on the knowledge of
provider’s processes, architectures, and visible controls
over the trust based on pure calculation.
Together, these studies provide evidence to support the
dynamic supply chain of cloud services, the inherent risk
in the supply chain, and the need for cloud stakeholders
to accept some degree of risk. While there are various
unaddressed issues with cloud computing risk and risk
assessment, there is a core element of trust, which seems
to inhibit cloud adoption, consequently calling for a
more transparent supply chain. The transparent supply
chain would require cloud providers to provide valuable
information to customers on how their sensitive data
is protected, giving the customers the opportunity to
question, test, and probe the security and privacy of
their data. In this ideal situation, enterprises have the
information they need to engage in a comprehensive
risk assessment of their cloud services and can make
optimal decisions about where and how to outsource
the processing of their data. As ISACA/CSA [43]
rightly puts it, ‘transparency into the adequacy of the
system of internal controls provides trust in operations,
confidence in the achievement of enterprise objectives
and an adequate understanding of residual risk’.
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2.1 Existing Approaches to Cloud Risk
Assessment
There is a relatively small volume of published studies
that have looked into cloud computing risk assessments
both from the academic and industrial communities.
The current state-of-the-art in cloud risk assessment
is presented in the works of Alturkistani et al. [5]
and Drissi and Benhadou [27], where the authors
classified the current cloud risk assessment approaches
into five and seven categories respectively. Apart from
the traditional risk assessment standards, frameworks
and guidance documents which are predominantly
qualitative, other cloud risk assessment models have
been proposed and developed over the years, and we
present here a cross-section of these studies.
QUIRC, which stands for Quantitative Impact and
Risk Assessment Framework for Cloud Security, is
presented in [68]. QUIRC is a quantitative risk
assessment model that operates based on six key security
objectives, similar to Microsoft’s STRIDE [57]. QUIRC
uses the Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS)
model (LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH) for the potential impact
definition and assigns scores to the threat scenarios
affecting these six security objectives (SO). It employs
a modified wide-band Delphi method to scientifically
collect numerical estimates for the impact of events and
the degree of confidence in the probability values, to
arrive at a consensus on the value of a risk. In [69],
Shameli-sendi and Cheriet proposed a risk assessment
model for cloud computing based on fuzzy multi-criteria
decision-making technique and uses expert opinions
to weigh the impact of threat on the confidentiality,
integrity and availability of an IT asset. The proposed
framework is quantitative, iterative, and follows an
incremental approach that is capable of providing
cloud consumers with a predictable lifecycle security
process for the development, adoption, and continual
improvement of their cloud security solution. Similarly,
Liu and Liu [53] proposed an information security
risk assessment model based on analytic hierarchy
process (AHP) for cloud computing environments.
Using the integrated method of risk analysis, they
combine qualitative and quantitative analysis methods
and complement it with expert experience and objective
facts to perform a comprehensive cloud risk assessment.
SECCRIT (SEcure Cloud computing for CRitical
Infrastructure IT) is a cloud risk assessment model,
developed to assist organisations in determining the risk
associated with the adoption of a particular cloud service
[11]. In support of an organisations’ decision-making,
they define an extension to existing asset-driven risk
assessment processes. They take the assessment result
of a non-cloud deployment and augment it with risks
associated with cloud deployment scenario. In a similar
approach to SECCRIT, Cayirci et al. [18] designed
the cloud adoption risk assessment model (CARAM), a
qualitative and relative model that helps cloud customers
with assessing the various business, security and privacy
risks in the cloud. It is based on existing frameworks
of organisations such as European Union Agency for
Network and Information Security (ENISA), CSA,
and Commission Nationale de l’informatique et des
Liberts (CNIL). It is proposed as a ranking algorithm
that matches cloud customer requirements with cloud
provider services, with each CP given a risk score
based on their response to the Consensus Assessments
Initiative Questionnaire (CAIQ). The EU-funded project
OPTIMIS [26] also developed a risk assessment
method that applies to different cloud stakeholders
at various stages of the cloud service provisioning
lifecycle. The risk assessment framework shows how
supply chain transparency assists cloud providers in
assessing the risks of their infrastructure provider (IP),
stressing the importance of past service level agreement
(SLA) performance, geographical location, security
compliance, business stability and general infrastructure,
in assessing the risk of the infrastructure provider.
Zalazar et al. [76] developed a security and compliance
ontology for cloud service agreements, which can help
consumers to evaluate security risks of a cloud service
and to make a decision on whether to adopt the cloud
service.
In all the studies reviewed here, there was a distinct
lack of consideration for the risks inherent in the
complex, dynamic, and interdependent supply chain, and
how it could affect the frequency of a threat or the
impact of such threat on a cloud asset. We hypothesise
that this could be due to the lack of transparency of
cloud providers or the limited visibility customers have
into the security controls implemented by the providers.
Likewise, none of the studies reviewed expressed the
value of risk in financial terms, an approach which is
known to help with presenting a clear picture of risk
to decision-makers and help justify significant security
investments [67][9].
With these highlighted gaps, we identify the need for
researchers to look into the problem of supply chain
risks in cloud computing, with the view of improving
cloud risk assessment through the transparency of the
supply chain. Currently, no other study has addressed
this problem, and neither has there been a solution that
proposes the application of a quantitative probabilistic
method to cloud risk assessment, presenting the value
of risk as a dollar value. We believe such cloud
risk assessment approach will provide organisations
with an objective risk result, that is consistent, easy
to understand by the decision makers and encourages
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the mitigation of cloud risks to an acceptable level.
Based on the complexity of the cloud supply chain,
we identify a need to discover members of the supply
chain, particularly the first tier suppliers, as part of
determining the probable source of cyber risk to the
cloud service. Likewise, we identify a requirement
to model cloud risks quantitatively, using mathematical
simulations which according to Burtescu [28] is suited
to events that are uncertain over time. Combining
this model with a decision support tool would make it
applicable to scenarios in which the perception of an
event is different from one individual to another.
3 THE CLOUD SUPPLY CHAIN
Cloud supply chain can be defined as a complex system
of two or more parties that work together to provide,
develop, host, manage, monitor or use cloud services;
with each facing internal and external risk factors and
influences that make it uncertain whether and when
they will achieve their cloud service objectives. The
term ‘cloud supply chain’ was coined out of more
traditional terms such as IT supply chain and cyber
supply chain. Lindner et al. reckon the application
of supply chain concept to cloud computing to be
innovative and suggest the possibility of a new research
field [52]. They proceed to define cloud supply chain
as two or more parties linked by the provision of cloud
services, related information and funds. The cloud
supply chain is an end-to-end process, that is not limited
to the delivery of services but includes other aspects such
as market mediation, security, billing, legal, performance
monitoring, accountability and QoS [60][52][74][73].
Organisations that provide or use cloud services operate
in a complex dynamic environment, involving multiple
supply chains, and need to feel confident that providers
further down that chain are accountable for how they
manage personal and confidential data [31]. All actors
within the cloud supply chain exchange services for
money and add value to other actors’ offering through
the refinement of services that ultimately fulfil customer
needs [50].
Cloud computing signals the move of an
organisation’s IT system from an integrated supply chain
to a dynamic one. Cloud computing transforms the
traditional hardware-based outsourcing of data centres
and the delivery of software products off-the-shelf to
‘as-a-service’ products (IaaS and SaaS respectively)
[50]. The supply chain of such offering is inherently
complex and consists of globally-distributed and
dynamic collections of people, process and technologies
[59]. The automated provisioning of cloud resources
makes it difficult for consumers to identify the physical
Figure 1: The Cloud Supply Chain
location of their data. Due to the dynamism of the cloud
supply chain, it is unpredictable and highly volatile [52],
but some of these concerns can be neutralised by the
flexibility of a resilient architecture [70][25]. Abbadi
and Lyle identified the advantages of a dynamic cloud,
such as resilience and scalability, but also acknowledge
its introduction of new security, logging and auditing
challenge [1]. Similarly, Pearson argues that a dynamic
supply chain enables businesses to strike a balance
between the opportunities that drive economic growth
and the downside risks of disruptive events within the
chain [61].
Boyson et al. [16], define cyber supply chain
as ‘the entire set of key actors involved with/using
cyber infrastructure: system end-users, policy-makers,
acquisition specialists, system integrators, network
providers, and software/hardware suppliers’. Taking a
cue from the definition, we briefly describe how the main
actors involved in the delivery of a cloud service perform
their role in what we termed the ‘five cloud computing
supply chain elements’, as shown in Figure 1
The five key elements of a cloud supply chain can be
listed as follows:
1. Cloud Service Provider (CSP): The CSP is
the entity directly responsible for making a
cloud service available to the customer. The
CSP is defined by the Committee of Sponsoring
Organizations of the Treadway Commission
(COSO) as a thrid-party vendor that provides
application delivery, monitoring, hosting and other
services through cloud computing [20]. The CSP
is the first tier of the supply chain and is directly
responsible for the provision of adequate SLA
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level protection, compliance, data privacy, security,
etc. for the cloud service. Cloud computing
technologies rely on an agile model, which puts
an added responsibility on CSPs to manage the
dynamic supply chain [61]. However, the security
responsibility of data hosted in the cloud is shared
between the CSP and the cloud customer, but
the ability for cloud customers to carry out their
allocated responsibility is often hampered by a
seeming lack of the CSP’s transparency, especially
around the visibility of currently implemented
security controls [64][65][6]. Examples of CSPs
are Amazon and Salesforce.
2. Hosting Infrastructure: The hosting
infrastructure for the cloud includes the physical
resources (servers, routers, firewalls, power, and
cooling systems), infrastructure, and platform
layers of the cloud architecture together with their
associated technologies [77]. A cloud provider’s
approach to managing hosting infrastructures
depends on their service or deployment model.
For example, the IaaS provider will be required to
decide on the server manufacturer, Internet Service
Provider (ISP), Application Programming Interface
(API) provider, and web platform solution, that
meet their cloud needs, while the SaaS provider
relies on an already coupled service from a PaaS
or IaaS provider. Popular hosting infrastructure
providers are Softlayer (a core of the IBM cloud)
and Rackspace.
3. Delivery Platform: Cloud services are accessed
through a myriad of devices including servers,
desktops, laptops and mobile devices. Consumer
services hosted in the cloud are mainly web-based,
requiring no prior installations. Cloud services,
particularly SaaS applications accessible via mobile
devices, access back-end systems via APIs, making
them prime targets for malicious attacks [2].
According to Belmans and Lambrette [10], the
increase in demand for mobile applications has
accelerated SaaS adoption, a development which
Charney and Werner [21] suggests has mitigated
some risks and introduced or compounded others.
The increased numbers of parties, devices and
applications involved in cloud service delivery, lead
to an increase in attack surface and consequentially
a higher threat of data compromise [78].
4. Control Systems: With the dynamic supply chain
of cloud applications, there is a high tendency for
the various moving parts involved in the delivery
of the cloud service to spiral out of the provider’s
control. CSPs require a robust framework to verify
their applications’ security properties, backup,
access control, monitoring and forecast demand.
Establishing a proactive monitoring system often
can help to identify a disruption before its cause
is apparent [70]. Likewise, implementing security
controls, such as firewalls and intrusion detection
systems (IDS) help CSPs to protect customer
data. Some of the control systems need to be
provided by the focal CSP, while others are the
responsibility of other third parties within the
supply chain, but in all situations, the focal CSP
needs to demand visibility to ensure compliance
with customer requirements. A useful list of control
systems required for the proper functioning of a
cloud service includes vulnerability management,
logging, audit, identification and authentication,
access control, encryption, continuity and incident
management [7].
5. Cloud Customer: According to Felici et al. [31],
a cloud customer (individual/firm) is an entity that
maintains a business relationship with and uses
the services of a cloud provider. An individual
cloud customer, in most cases, doubles up as
the end-consumer or the cloud subject, while an
organisational cloud customer could range from
a cloud broker, cloud aggregator, or the end-user
organisation. A cloud broker interfaces between
the cloud service provider and the consumer,
translating user requirements to appropriate cloud
offerings [47]. Cloud aggregators like brokers
combine a large number of small and modular
services to present to customers as a value-added
service tailored to consumer needs [13]. However,
contrary to the traditional description of cloud
providers, Bohm and Riedl [13] argue that there
are only a few cloud providers while all others are
brokers, who buy network capacity and resell it
under the ‘cloud provider’ label. Similarly, Kushida
et al. [49], maintain that datacentre outsourcing
or owning a single datacentre does not make an
organisation a cloud provider, but that the real
power of the cloud is in its dynamic allocation of
resources and the ‘illusion’ of infinite scale.
An important theme that emerged from the above
description of the cloud supply chain is that the cloud
consumer is the starting point of a service request and the
endpoint of a service delivery. The customer eventually
pays all value-adding activities within the cloud supply
chain. With most cloud products available from different
value networks, the loyalty of customers, providers and
suppliers to one another would seem to be constantly
in doubt. Cloud customers look to change providers,
particularly after an outage to avoid a repeat situation.
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Also, seeing that each member of the supply chain faces
an ever-changing list of security threats, it is challenging
for focal CSPs to provide security assurances.
3.1 A Novel Cloud Risk Assessment Model –
CSCCRA
Reflecting on the gaps identified in our literature review,
and building on our knowledge of the dynamic cloud
supply chain, we propose the Cloud Supply Chain
Cyber Risk Assessment (CSCCRA) model, as shown
in Figure 2. The CSCCRA model is the combination
of a quantitative risk assessment method, decision
support analysis, and supply chain mapping. The
model looks to address the gap on how the lack of
supply chain transparency and limited visibility of third-
party vendors’ security controls have contributed to the
inadequate level of cloud risk assessment. Knowing
that this can be a difficult undertaking, not least
because of the unpredictable and chaotic cloud supply
chain, we adopt the systems thinking approach to
solving complex system problems as suggested by
Ghadge et al. [33]. This method requires us to
conceptualise and analyse the interdependencies of a
cloud service during risk assessment while making use of
modelling and simulation techniques to draw the result
of the assessment. The CSCCRA model takes a cue
from standards and guidance documents such as ISO
27005:2011 [42], ISO 31000:2009 [41], NIST 800-30v1
[66], and FAIR risk assessment [32]. The three main
components of the CSCCRA model are as follows:
1. Quantitative Risk Assessment: The CSCCRA
model goes beyond the IT industry norm to apply
a quantitative assessment method to cloud risks
for at least three reasons. First, the ability to
express risks as the combination of the probability
of an event and its consequences as per ISO Guide
73:2009 [28]. Second, the rigorous process that
goes into the determination of risk factors [40], and
third, its potential for increased objectivity through
the use of controlled experimentation [32]. With
uncertainty being the primary factor in risk analysis,
the CSCCRA model makes use of a probabilistic
estimate of risk factors, e.g. threat frequency,
vulnerability and loss magnitude, representing the
estimates as a distribution (e.g. PERT, Poisson), and
inputting the values into a Monte Carlo simulation
engine.
2. Decision Support Analysis (Supplier Rating):
As a CSP-targeted solution, the CSCCRA model
requires the cloud providers to be aware of their
cloud service supply chain and have sufficient
information about the processes, capabilities and
offerings of their partners. We introduced decision
support analysis to cloud risk assessment to address
the notion of a distorted and incomplete process
involved in cloud supplier selection. The decision
support analysis involves decomposing the cloud
service into its component objects and using a
multi-criteria decision tool, rate all entities based
on their observed behaviours, to identify weak
suppliers easily susceptible to cyberattack or those
with a high risk of failure. According to Ghadge
et al. [33], identifying the potential weak spots in
the supply chain through a dynamic model helps
to capture its vulnerability and promote proactive
mitigation of risks. The CSCCRA makes use of
an improper linear model for decision analysis,
helping CSPs to consider areas where the chain is
weakest during risk factor estimation.
3. Supply Chain Mapping: Providing end-to-end
supply chain visualisation while assessing cloud
risk makes it amenable to analyse and explore
areas of weakness, strengths and the potential
risks to a cloud service while also supporting
collaboration and decision-making within the chain
[71]. Visualising the information flow of a cloud
service through the supply chain helps to identify
critical suppliers and single points of failure (SPOF)
within the chain. The benefit of a graphical
representation of the inherent risk in the supply
chain helps to counter any documented biases in
risk estimation and decision-making and is thought
to have an impact in reducing the cognitive load
involved in the evaluation of risk factors [34]. The
CSCCRA model employs supply chain mapping
during the decision support analysis stage of the risk
assessment, to allow for continuous monitoring and
visibility of the current state of cloud risk, and to
enable a data-driven risk estimation, not one based
on instinct.
4 CLOUD RISK ASSESSMENT SURVEY
4.1 Survey Methodology
This survey was approved by the University of Oxford’s
Central Research Ethics Committee, under Ref No:
R50232/RE001. The survey instrument was designed
to be self-administered and was built using the Bristol
Online Survey (BOS) tool [14]. The welcome page
contained a brief introduction to the research, survey
goals and the anonymity of data provided. We kept
the survey anonymous to allow for an open and honest
response from the respondents.
Four fundamental goals drove the collection and
analysis of the survey data, and they are as follows:
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Figure 2: The Cloud Supply Chain Cyber Risk Assessment (CSCCRA) model
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1. To understand the level of awareness cloud
stakeholders have about supply chain risks.
2. To capture the decision-making process involved in
cloud supplier selection.
3. To identify conventional risk
identification/assessment methodologies employed
within cloud provider and consumer environments.
4. To identify factors that contribute to the supply
chain risks in cloud computing.
We administered the survey to a convenient sample
of cloud stakeholders, considered to be experts, with
information on how organisations approach cloud risks
and the effect of the supply chain. These participants
were recruited within the UK, mainly through the
distribution of a survey recruitment calling cards during
cloud conferences, and through collaborations with the
Cloud Industry Forum (CIF) and the London Chapter
of Information Systems Audit and Control Association
(ISACA). The survey instrument [3] was administered
to respondents between March and July 2017.
Because of the heterogeneous way in which firms
perceive and manage risk, and the limited nature of the
sample, the analysis of the survey is at this stage only
descriptive. However, it does provide some insight into
the range of approaches taken by firms.
4.2 Survey Result and Discussion
After careful analysis of the survey data, a total of sixty-
two (62) respondents completed the questionnaire. The
analysis of the data confirmed there was no missing
information in these responses, as the Boston Online
Survey (BOS) tool was designed not to proceed to the
next page in cases where mandatory questions were left
unanswered. The data that makes up the final dataset
in this analysis is made up of fully completed forms.
The frequency table, Table 1, shows a summary of the
demography.
Having established the quality of the participants,
we begin our analysis with the response of the cloud
providers, followed by that of cloud customers, and
conclude with the analysis of the general questions posed
to all respondents.
4.2.1 Cloud Providers
A combined total of 22 cloud providers responded to the
survey. The service provided by each of the respondents
ranged from cloud security, email, monitoring, storage,
Runtime/API, customer relationship management
(CRM) and financial services. When asked if
the respondents carried out a comprehensive risk
assessment, the majority of the respondents answered
yes, except for three participants. Sixteen providers
estimated the level of comprehensiveness for their
risk assessment to be in the region of 71% to 100%,
while four rated themselves between 51-70%, and the
remaining two were between 20-50%. The response of
the participants to why they conducted risk assessment
was not surprising, with the assurance of the security
triad (availability, confidentiality and integrity) their top
priority. Other suggestions including the identification
of weak links in the supply chain, improved decision-
making or better understanding of risk were lower on
their priority list. Interestingly, we observed that on
average each of the cloud providers relied on at least
eight other suppliers for the delivery of their service.
While considering if the risk assessment process of
cloud providers took into account supply chain risks,
we asked the respondents to answer the question as
“yes”, “partially” or “no”, and provide a percentage
estimate. Their response showed that 18 of the
22 cloud providers somewhat considered their supply
chain risks with varying degrees, while four did not
consider supply chain risks at all. With the majority
of the responses being positive, this feedback somewhat
negates their response to the reasons for carrying out
a risk assessment, where its use for monitoring weak
links in the supply chain had a low response rate.
However, in answer to the question on transparency with
customers about their dependence on external providers,
all but four cloud provider respondents, reported that
they were transparent. Although we recall a recent
outage of a major cloud provider that impacted the
services of an anti-virus (AV) provider, alerting the AV
provider and their consumers to their dependence on
the cloud giant. So, the fact that over 80% of the
cloud providers in this sample provide supply chain
information up front does not necessarily guarantee
that the information provided met the three criteria
for transparent information identified by Hofstede [39],
which are: (a) quality of data; (b) quality of format; and
(c) quality of meaning.
In response to the question seeking to find out the
three most important criteria cloud providers consider
when choosing partners, the top three answers were: i)
security of the cloud service ii) reputation of the vendor;
iii) functionality of the service, see Figure 3. Also on
the subject of the transparency of supply chain and its
impact on risk assessment, the providers corroborated
the results of our earlier research, acknowledging many
of the identified transparency features [4] as essential
components of a comprehensive risk assessment. When
participants were asked for the largest risk to their
cloud services, they listed several risks including human
error, the introduction of new cloud feature, zero-day
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Table 1: Relevant demographic and cloud computing data from respondents (N = 62)
Demographics Frequency %
Principal Industry Manufacturing 1 1.61%
Transportation 2 3.23%
Government 3 4.84%
Education / Research 4 6.45%
Other (Media, trade, construction) 10 16.13%
Finance (Banking, Insurance, etc.) 12 19.35%
Information Technology/
Telecommunications 30 48.39%
Sector Private 54 87.10%
Public 8 12.90%
Company size 1 - 9 12 19.35%
10 - 50 5 8.06%
51 - 250 6 9.68%
251 - 500 5 8.06%
501 - 1000 6 9.68%
1000+ 28 45.16%
Cloud service model IaaS 28 45.16%
PaaS 12 19.35%
SaaS 22 35.48%
Cloud role Cloud Consumer (CC) 40 64.52%
Infrastructure Provider (IP) 4 6.45%
Cloud Service Provider (CSP) 12 19.35%
Application Service Provider (ASP) 6 9.68%
attacks, data breaches, web application vulnerability,
supplier change control, but the top on the list was the
unavailability of the service.
With regards to their risk assessment process, ten
cloud providers attested to carrying out a continuous
risk assessment of their cloud service, two (monthly),
while four each (quarterly and yearly), and the last
two only after a security incident. According to
Boyens et al. [15], the dynamic nature of the cloud
calls for a continuous risk assessment, because while
the current ‘check-box’ type risk evaluation system
is good for regulatory compliance or adherence to
standards, it is inadequate for the accelerated growth
of cloud computing [43]. With regards to risk analysis
methodology, 17 cloud providers indicated that they
used both qualitative and quantitative methods, while
five others opted for the qualitative approach. The
follow-on question which asked for the specific risk
assessment method highlighted the widespread use of
qualitative methods, including weighted scoring and
risk matrices which are considered ‘weak’ quantitative
methods. According to Hubbard and Seiersen [40], one
of the errors of assessing risk using a risk matrix is that
of range compression, where a higher risk cell could
contain a lower in comparison to another in a lower risk
cell. As Figure 4 shows, only two provider respondents
confirmed their use of a mathematical simulation.
As Figure 4 indicates, the quantitative risk assessment
methodologies are not common within the cloud
industry, despite their obvious benefits, including their
ability to maintain internal and external consistency with
the meanings and proportionality of the values used for
risk estimation. We made this observation also as part of
our literature review, so to further establish our findings,
we asked cloud providers how the value of risk was
expressed within their organisation. Sixteen of those
surveyed responded that they used impact/likelihood
rating, nine represented risk using its monetary value,
five used probability distributions and three expressed
risk value using time. In [32], Freund and Jones
described one of the advantages of using quantitative
over qualitative methods to be its ability to decompose
10
O. Akinrolabu, S. New, A. Martin: Cyber Supply Chain Risks in Cloud Computing – Bridging the Risk Assessment Gap

























Figure 4: Risk assessment methods most commonly used within provider organisations
the relevant risk loss scenarios. Such rigour does not
seem to apply to the subjective selection of impact and
likelihood ratings, further disqualifying the application
of qualitative risk assessment in assessing the risk of the
dynamic cloud supply chain.
4.2.2 Cloud Customers
A total of 40 cloud consumers responded to the survey,
each of whom are subscribers of at least one SaaS
application. Of the 40 cloud customer respondents,
15 were from SMEs (1-250 employees), and 25 were
from larger organisations. On the subject of the
comprehensiveness of cloud risk assessment, 34 of the
respondents indicated they followed a thorough process.
Also, 19 respondents confirmed to accounting for their
provider’s supply chain risks in their risk assessment,
while 15 partially considered their supply chain, leaving
six respondents who did not consider supply chain risks.
It is however not clear to what extent the provider
supply chain risks were accounted for since it requires
having knowledge of third parties and the impact these
suppliers could have on the cloud service. Following
careful analysis of the respondents who claimed to
account for their providers’ supply chain in their risk
assessments, 25 of them were consumers of email and
productivity tools from cloud giants such as Microsoft
and Google. On the face of it, it is possible that these
respondents erroneously believe their cloud providers
are the only member of their supply chain, which is
rarely the case. That said, a minor difference between
the provider and consumer responses came when we
asked the consumer respondents the important reasons
for carrying out a cloud risk assessment. Their top
three options for conducting risk assessments were:
i) ensuring confidentiality of the cloud service (34),
ii) ensuring availability of the cloud service (30), iii)
better understanding of risk (28), see Figure 5 for more
information.
There was a positive correlation between the provider
and consumer responses on the need to have relevant
supply chain information to conduct a comprehensive
cloud risk assessment. Nevertheless, a more significant
concern for cloud customers was the possibility of their
provider going out of business or being locked-in to
a long-term contract. On the subject of risk analysis
methodology, 19 cloud consumer respondents used both
quantitative and qualitative models, while 14 used only
qualitative, with the last seven respondents using neither
of the methods, preferring to use expert judgements on
11
Open Journal of Cloud Computing (OJCC), Volume 5, Issue 1, 2018
Figure 5: Cloud consumers’ most important reasons for carrying out cloud risk assessment
a ‘need-to’ basis. Similar to cloud providers, the use
of risk assessment as a decision-making support tool
was common also to cloud consumer organisations, and
their most common method was also the qualitative
description of impact/likelihood, selected by 34 of the
40 respondents. This method seems to be popular across
the IT industry, together with other techniques such
as the risk matrices (28 of 40) and expert judgement
(22 of 40), see figure 6. None of the consumers
surveyed used mathematical simulations, which was
not shocking, considering the arguments of Freund and
Jones [32] and Power [63], on how the bias of regulatory
organisations like the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) and COSO against quantitative
risk assessment, influenced the use of more qualitative
assessment methods within the IT industry.
As a final question to the cloud consumer respondents,
we asked if in the last year they have had a supply
chain related security incident, which was not a direct
responsibility of their focal cloud provider, and nine of
the consumer respondents answered in the affirmative.
Of the nine responses, four had an availability related
events, two were privacy-related, and the others were
the loss of confidentiality and authentication issues.
With this in mind, some of the countermeasures cloud
consumer respondents listed as being in operation within
their organisation, are tabulated verbatim in Table 2.
4.2.3 General Questions
In the concluding section of the survey, the combined
group of respondents (62), were presented with a set
of general risk and supply chain related questions to
validate some of the knowledge we acquired from
our review of the literature. The first general
question required respondents to select what they
believe constituted the top four hindrances to a more
comprehensive cloud risk assessment, from a list of
seven options, as seen in Figure 7. While we were
not surprised with the choices of the respondents,
their emphasis on the need for transparency in cloud
computing is in agreement with our earlier work and
also the study of [20], which established the extent
to which cloud transparency could help to reduce
the risk of cloud adoption. With cloud computing’s
survival based on a dynamic and complex supply chain,
we argue that the transparency of cloud providers by
way of providing reasonable visibility of controls and
processes promotes better risk assessment. Also, we
observed that some of the respondents raised the topic
of cost and limited training, two factors often cited
when SMEs are asked to conduct a quantitative risk
assessment. One of the respondents in contributing to
the list of hindrances to a comprehensive risk assessment
noted the ”lack of awareness amongst suppliers about
security risks and how to protect against them”. The
respondent stressed that the ”security standards in the
cloud industry were too low”. Another respondent also
identified the hindrance of limited resources, saying
”there is a shortage of qualified experts to perform
comprehensive risk assessment”. Some of the other
barriers named include ”Lack of adherence of cloud
suppliers to assurance standards (e.g., CSA STAR
programme)” and ”the poor response rate of large CSPs
to due diligence requests”.
The next question we posed to the respondents was
aimed at finding out their security priorities and in
what order they were worried about the confidentiality,
integrity and availability of their cloud service. Table 3
presents a breakdown of their responses. From Table 3,
we can see that both providers and consumers prioritised
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Figure 6: Cloud consumers’ most commonly used risk assessment method for decision making
Table 2: Cloud consumer’s threat mitigation
No. Countermeasures for mitigating cloud threats
1 Comprehensive contract management and an exit clause/strategy
2
Detailed Auditing and Logging to identify baseline to know
what normal traffic looks like and identify malicious behaviour
3 Encryption of sensitive data transmitted to provider
4
Due diligence in supplier selection at the time of new/incremental
business award should identify the risks associated with potential
suppliers and eliminate any where the risk is too high
5 Ensuring that credentials are not stored in an insecure manner
6 Backup, Redundancy and Up-to-date business continuity plans
7 Active Directory federation. Firewalls, Data Loss Protection
8 Local software capability to provide off-line services
9
Private Virtual Networks, Identity federation, encryption at
rest and in transit, multi site hosting, DNS
10 E-mail continuity solution and Cloud Access Security Broker (CASB)
11
Monitoring of supplier compliance with security and data protection
requirements specified in the contract
12 Use of strong password policies
Figure 7: Hindrances to a more comprehensive risk assessment
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Table 3: Security triad (CIA) order in which cloud stakeholders are worried about their cloud supply chain
Class Security Concern Order Count
CP Loss of Confidentiality Low 6
CP Loss of Confidentiality Medium 6
CP Loss of Confidentiality High 10
CP Loss of Integrity Low 6
CP Loss of Integrity Medium 12
CP Loss of Integrity High 4
CP Loss of Availability Low 10
CP Loss of Availability Medium 4
CP Loss of Availability High 8
CC Loss of Confidentiality Low 6
CC Loss of Confidentiality Medium 8
CC Loss of Confidentiality High 26
CC Loss of Integrity Low 19
CC Loss of Integrity Medium 19
CC Loss of Integrity High 2
CC Loss of Availability Low 15
CC Loss of Availability Medium 12
CC Loss of Availability High 12
the availability and confidentiality of data over the
integrity. This might be because they have solutions
in place that can detect message integrity, solutions
such as end-to-end data protection, and metadata
checksumming. Nonetheless, the analysis of the result
would seem to suggest that the loss of integrity is a
medium priority for both cloud provider and customer
organisations. Lastly, seeing that the CSA top 12
treacherous threats [37] was the result of a survey that
compiled industry experts opinion on cloud threats, we
decided to confirm which of the threats our respondents
thought were supply chain related.
Our motivation is to have a validated reference guide
for supply chain-related cloud security threats since the
CSA survey is widely regarded as the most authoritative
and up-to-date cloud survey. As shown in Figure 8,
the respondents opined that the 12 threats are supply
chain related, with varying level of popularity. This
observation follows an earlier established claim by NIST
[15], who suggested that the ICT supply chain threat
agents are similar to the information security threats
agents, citing insiders and cybercriminals as examples.
The threats that many of those surveyed agreed on,
include: data breaches, insecure interfaces and API,
system vulnerabilities, malicious insiders, data loss,
insufficient due diligence, Denial of Service(DoS) and
shared technology vulnerabilities. Unsurprisingly, these
were the threats we hypothesised to be supply chain
related at the initial stage of our research, although we
added insufficient IAM and, abuse and nefarious use of
cloud services, which from Figure 8 have at least 19 of
the 62 respondents agreeing with this choice. We hope
to use this list of threats as potential causes of supply
chain risks during the risk modelling stages of our risk
assessment.
4.2.4 Summary
Together these results provide valuable insights into
the level of awareness cloud stakeholders have on
supply chain risks, cloud risk assessment and other
cloud decision-making processes. The results broadly
speak for themselves. Although there seems to be
a good awareness of supply chain risk among cloud
stakeholders, their approach to assessing the risk cannot
be said to be keeping up with the dynamic growth
of cloud computing. Conducting risk assessments on
a yearly basis gives organisations a false sense of
security, while the use of qualitative methods for risk
assessment is not considered to be rigorous enough to
help decompose and model cloud risks appropriately.
Furthermore, there remains the all-important issue of
cloud transparency, which as we have seen is a major
component of cloud risk assessment.
One concern expressed regarding risk assessment,
in general, was the challenge of small enterprises to
conduct cloud risk assessment. These companies who
usually do not have a dedicated IT team nor individuals
with the specialised skill for IT risk assessment seem
to rely on their cloud provider to take care of their
valuable assets. In providing a final comment on
the survey, one of the respondents said ’As a small
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Figure 8: CSA’s top 12 cloud computing threats that are supply chain related
company it is challenging to identify appropriate risk
assessment due to lack of specialist staff. This means
we are highly reliant on our cloud service provider to
manage risk issues downstream and rely on our SLA for
commercial management of our contractual expectations
of service’. Perhaps, a good suggestion would be for
cloud customers to trust but verify that their confidence
in the cloud provider is not misplaced, which is only
possible through a transparent supply chain.
5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this study, we set out to describe the supply chain
of a cloud service and examine how acknowledging
the inherent risk within the supply chain could bridge
the risk assessment gap. The survey results showed a
widespread use of qualitative risk assessment methods
and identified the lack of cloud provider transparency as
the top hindrance to a comprehensive risk assessment.
Many of those surveyed had a good awareness of supply
chain risks, and a majority of the respondents even
confirmed that most of the Cloud Security Alliances top
12 treacherous threats had its origin in the supply chain.
Nonetheless, awareness alone is not sufficient for the
survival of the cloud, which is reliant on a dynamic,
complex and often opaque supply chain. Therefore, the
ability of cloud providers to provide reasonable visibility
of controls and processes both of themselves and their
third parties will contribute to the improvement of cloud
risk assessment.
Despite its exploratory nature, the evidence from
this study suggests that the current approach to cloud
risk assessment is unable to address the cloud risks.
Furthermore, with an apparent lack of trust in cloud
providers, cloud customers who set out to conduct risk
assessments for decision-making, are constrained to
carrying out qualitative and subjective assessments due
to the limited transparency. While this study did not
confirm if quantitative risk assessment would provide
better results, it did partially substantiate the need for
more rigour in cloud risk assessments and provide
evidence on how this can be improved with supply chain
transparency.
Therefore, to bridge the cloud risk assessment gap,
we proposed the Cloud Supply Chain Cyber Risk
Assessment (CSCCRA) model. The CSCCRA model
which is currently being targeted at cloud providers
would require each CSP to be aware of the logical and
physical dependencies they have on their supply chain.
The proposed model will combine quantitative risk
assessment, decision analysis and supply chain mapping
to provide a more iterative, incremental and inclusive
approach to risk assessment. The model provides
stakeholders with a unique capability for capturing
the dynamic behaviour of risks within a cloud supply
chain and objectively measure the overall risk value
of the cloud service. The structured and systematic
approach to the model would also aid decision makers in
understanding their current security posture, how much
security is required and why, increase the assurance on
the effectiveness of security investments, and identify
weak spots in the current supply chain.
Future research will focus on developing the model
into a cloud risk assessment tool. The decision support
and mapping tool will help address the problem of weak
links in a supply chain, by identifying suppliers with an
inadequate security posture, while the quantitative risk
assessment model will make use of stochastic modelling
to reduce the level of uncertainty and subjectivity in
the cloud risk evaluation process. We aim to present
the value of a risk as a dollar value and express the
rate of risk occurrence or its impact as a probabilistic
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range. Once the system is developed and validated by
academic and industry experts, we will look to verify
its effectiveness by conducting real-world case studies
with cloud providers. We hypothesise that the rigour
involved in the risk assessment process would improve
its accuracy and provide decision-makers with a clearer
picture of their cloud risks.
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